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Monetary Policy and Economic Performance of West African 
Monetary Zone Countries 
By 
 
E. D. Balolgun*   
 
Abstract:   
This study examined the monetary and macroeconomic stability perspective for entering 
into monetary union, using data available on WAMZ countries.  It tests the hypothesis that 
independent monetary and exchange rate policies have been relatively ineffective in influencing 
domestic activities (especially GDP and inflation), and that when they do, they are counter 
productive. Usiing econometric methods, regression result show that, erstwhile domestic 
monetary policy, as captured by money supply and credit to government hurt real domestic 
output of these countries.  Indeed, rather than promote growth, it was a source of stagnation.  It 
also confirms that there appear to be a two quarters lag in monetary policy transmission effect 
with regard to real sector output.  The results also show that although expansion in domestic 
output dampened aggregate consumer prices (inflation), it was however, not adequate enough to 
dampen the fuelling effects of past inflation.  This was accentuated by money supply variable 
(MS2) and aggravated by exchange rate variable which are mostly positive, confirming the a 
priori expectations that rapid monetary expansion and devaluations fuels domestic inflation.   A 
country by country comparison of the single and simultaneous equations model results show that 
expansionary monetary policy contributed more to fuelling prices than it did to growth.  It also 
shows that interest rates policy had adverse effects on GDP by exhibiting a positive sign 
contrary to the theoretical expectation of an inverse relationship.  The results also show that 
exchange rate devaluations manifest mainly in domestic inflation and have no effect at all on the 
growth variable, in the short term.  The study concludes that these countries would be better-off 
to surrender its independence over these policy instruments to the planned regional body under 
appropriate monetary union arrangements. 
1.  Introduction 
The desire to evolve a common currency for the ECOWAS sub region has been in the 
offing since the birth of the regional integration body.  This was considered expedient given the 
fact that there exist in the sub region one of the oldest monetary union – UEMOA.  This 
informed the setting up of the 2nd West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), proposed for non-
UEMOA, as a prelude and “fast-track” approach to ultimate unification and adoption of a 
common ECOWAS currency.    
The key elements of the fast-track approach require the need for these countries to pursue 
both monetary and fiscal policies that could lead to macroeconomic convergence.  Therefore, 
monetary policies which yield undesirable effects and which meant non-compliance with 
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convergence criteria tended to dim the prospects of adoption of common monetary policies and 
currency.  However, in this study, it is argued that relative monetary policies ineffectiveness can 
be an alternative test to macroeconomic convergence criteria for determining the takeoff of the 
WAMZ.   Indeed, the argument is that these countries could adopt the unionization strategy of 
Franco-phone West African Monetary Union, which as a group of countries became an optimal 
currency area ex post, without recourse to ex ante conditionality {Cobham and Robson (1993); 
Guilaumont, et. al. (1988); Masson and Pattillo (2001)}.  This test therefore argues that evidence 
of macroeconomic non-convergence rooted in the relative ineffectiveness of domestic monetary 
and exchange rate policies should suggest the need for the domestic monetary authorities to 
surrender such instruments to a superior regional agency via a monetary union.    
The pertinent research question that this study seeks to answer is: has an independent 
monetary and exchange rate policy of participating countries been important in the determination 
of macroeconomic outturns in the WAMZ countries that could imply significant losses when 
they give up its control?  The objective of this test is to assess the effect of monetary and 
exchange policy on the indicators of domestic economic performance for each of the country 
(GDP and Inflation).  The hypothesis to be tested is that independent monetary and exchange 
rate policies within each of the participating countries have been relatively ineffective in 
influencing domestic activities (especially GDP and inflation). 
2. Literature Review 
 Appleyard and Field Jr (1998) define an optimum currency area (OCA) as an area that 
for optimal balance-of-payments adjustments and effectiveness of domestic macroeconomic 
policy, has fixed exchange rates within the area but maintain flexible exchange rates with 
trading partners outside the area.  
Theoretical Framework of Monetary Policies and OCA  
Robust criteria for measuring the suitability of countries for an OCA exist within the 
literature.  However, two classes can be distinguished viz: generalized criteria based on the 
degree of convergence or divergence from the optimality properties and most recently, the 
empirical criteria as a result of advancement in econometric techniques.  The main thrust of the 
generalized criteria is that countries exposed to similar symmetric shocks or possessing 
mechanisms for the absorption of similar asymmetric shocks may find it optimal to adopt a 
common currency.  OCA literature thus focuses on assessing the symmetry of output shocks in 
monetary unions or evaluating the absorption mechanisms such as labour mobility or fiscal 
transfers.  These linkage criteria have come to be known as the ex ante convergence criteria.  
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These criteria are often articulated using descriptive statistics as a rule of thumb in the 
determination of the suitability of a group of countries for a monetary union.  
 Four other criteria have emerged within the literature for measuring the suitability of 
countries for an OCA, which are the results of advancement in econometric methods are: (i) the 
“shocking” studies empirical measures; (ii) the “Krugman specialization hypothesis” test; (iii) 
the “endogeneity criteria hypothesis” test; and (iv) studies investigating developments within 
sovereign countries.  In line with this last approach, the focus of this paper is to evaluate the 
monetary policy impact criteria of OCA for the intending members of WAMZ. 
  Several authors investigated developments within sovereign countries, especially the 
nature of monetary and fiscal policy pursuits with the sole objective of determining their 
suitability for monetary union.  A good example of this type of study is reported by Masson and 
Pattillo (2004), in which they examine the suitability of Africa for a single currency.  Using 
studies investigating developments within sovereign countries, they concluded that while Africa 
may not be suitable for a single currency, but selective expansion of the existing ones could be 
used to induce countries to improve their policies.   
 Masson and Pattillo (2004) notes that although their analytical model is based on the 
optimum currency area literature, it identifies another important asymmetry: political distortions 
affecting fiscal policy decisions. The model highlights the monetary impact of country-specific 
differences in government financing needs and differences in distortions affecting fiscal policy. 
Governments exert control over the central bank and, in a monetary union, the central bank is 
assumed to maximize a weighted average of the member countries’ objective functions (where 
weights reflect relative GDP), while each government chooses its own fiscal policy. In each case, 
governments satisfy a one-period budget constraint that forces spending to be financed either by 
taxes or by the country’s share of monetary financing.  They further argue that since spending 
targets are unobservable, countries with higher per capita incomes can generally afford to offer 
more government services, as both revenues and spending rise in tandem, and this component 
causes no problem for inflation.  
 The calibration of the model uses the available data for 1995–2000 on 32 African 
countries’ government revenue, spending, and inflation to fit the model and estimate its 
parameter values. The comparison of outcomes for these variables across countries with 
independent currencies and those in monetary unions helps pin down the disciplining effect of a 
common currency.  They reach a conclusion that if there are differences in governments’ 
financing needs, the incentives to participate in a monetary union will differ across countries.  
Big spenders will benefit from the extra discipline afforded by the regional central bank, which 
partly offsets the inflation bias of their national central bank, while small spenders will incur 
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additional losses stemming from the excessive demands of the big spenders for monetary 
financing.  They further argue that since the union-wide inflation target of the common central 
bank will accommodate only the common component of supply disturbances (identified with 
terms of trade disturbances), this makes abandoning an independent monetary policy in the face 
of very different country-specific shocks costly.    
 In an earlier study Debrun, Masson and Pattillo (2003) drew on the recent literature and 
experience of monetary integration in Europe to examine the rationale for establishing regional 
currency unions in Western Africa. They concluded “that despite dramatic economic, political 
and historical differences between the two regions, the analysis indicates that monetary 
unification might well be beneficial for a number of the members of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS)”. They noted that “the main reason is that the costs 
stemming from the loss of monetary autonomy are often more than offset by the gains 
originating in the (partial) separation of monetary and fiscal powers”. They however cautioned 
that “large countries with relatively ambitious public expenditure objectives would not be 
attractive partners because they would be expected to pressure the common central bank, 
creating excessive inflation in the entire union. Hence, the desirability and sustainability of a 
currency union critically depends on fiscal discipline among its members. We also explore the 
vulnerability of regional monetary institutions to country-specific disturbances. Overall, the 
desirability of an ECOWAS monetary union requires a strong fiscal surveillance procedure both 
in the transition phase and after the establishment of the union.” 
 Other studies, using this approach maintain that historically, existing African monetary 
unions have been geared primarily towards macroeconomic stability right from the onset 
(Cobham and Robson (1993)).  On the basis of the experience of the CFA zone in West Africa, 
Devarajan and de Melo (1986) submit that “... it is generally agreed that membership of the zone 
has been beneficial because it has reduced instability, encouraged resource allocation and led to 
fewer distortionary policies to correct macro imbalances”.   Devarajan and de Melo (1978) and 
Guilaumont et al. (1988) measure the relative success of UEMOA by the fact that member 
countries have “experienced relatively low monetary growth, relatively strict budgetary 
discipline, no devaluation and hence consistently lower inflation than most other African 
countries”.  They further maintained that this stability was also accompanied by a generally 
better growth performance.  Guillaume and Stasavage (2000) in a similar study argue that the 
formation of a monetary union can improve policy credibility, especially so if exit from a union 
is made costly and institutions are designed to guarantee enforcement of monetary rules. 
 A recent investigative study by Duspaquier, Osakwe and Thangavelu (2005) seems to 
depart from this school of thought in its conclusions.  In this study titled “Choice of monetary 
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and exchange rate regime in ECOWAS: An OCA Analysis”, they argue that flexible exchange 
rate offer better policy options than monetary union in dealing with external imbalances.  Their 
paper compares a flexible exchange rate regime to a monetary union using a structural model of 
monetary policy in the spirit of Canzoneri and Henderson (1985), Buiter et al. (1995) and Lane 
(2000).  They examined the economic consequence of exchange rate regimes, focusing on 
establishing crucial trade-off between the transaction costs savings of a common currency and 
the stabilization benefits resulting from the ability to use the nominal exchange rate for 
adjustment to asymmetric shocks.  Their main result is that flexible exchange rates dominate 
monetary union in ECOWAS.  
 The major criticism of this study is that it did not address the issue of lack of credibility 
of monetary policy, and the potential of monetary union to act as an external agent of restraint on 
government fiscal and financial policy, with the great prospects for improving policy discipline.  
They, however argue that the incorporation of this effect will unduly bias the result against a 
flexible exchange rate regime because there is no guarantee that the expected credibility gain 
from this channel will be realised in the ECOWAS sub region.   
 Coleman (2001) examined three perspectives on an Australasian Monetary Union: (i) the 
benefits of monetary independence; (ii) the costs of separate currencies (iii) similarities of 
commodity and currency markets.  In this study, Coleman notes that in general, the theoretical 
expectation is that, ceteris paribus, an independent currency provides a country or region with 
the ability to achieve five main policy objectives.  These are: “(1) the ability to alter the value of 
the currency to stabilise economic output; (2) the ability to change interest rates to stabilise 
output; (3) the ability to choose the inflation rate; (4) the ability to change interest rates to alter 
income distribution; and (5) the ability to commandeer resources by issuing legal tender”.   He 
argues that monetary independence accompanied with exchange rate flexibility is useful only 
when three conditions hold: (i) shocks are country specific; (ii) alternative mechanisms for 
adjusting to shocks are weak; and (iii) exchange rate changes are effective as a means of 
alleviating idiosyncratic shocks.  This should be accompanied by an enabling environment 
whereby the countries could choose its own inflation and interest rates yield curves.  In the 
absence of all these, he concluded, that a country would be better off to forsake independent 
monetary and exchange rate policies in favour of a monetary union.  
Monetary Policy Impact Model for Monetary Union 
 This model is premise on the assumption that a nation is able to weigh the advantages 
involved with maintaining a domestic versus external targets for monetary policy, which requires 
a choice of either an independent or common operating target.   The argument is that the policy 
actions and outturn of each national central bank of intending member of a monetary union, is 
reflected in the outcomes of aggregate macroeconomic performance indicators, such as output 
(real GDP) and prices (inflation).  This is consistent with traditional view (Mason and Pattillo 
(2003)) that the transmission mechanism between the instruments of monetary policy and its 
ultimate targets – whether inflation or economic activity – is generally considered to operate 
through four channels: (i) direct interest rate effects, which influence investment decisions and 
the choice between consuming now and consuming later; (ii) indirect effects via other asset 
prices, such as prices of bonds, equities and real estate, which will influence spending through 
balance sheet and cash flow effects; (iii) exchange rate effects, which will change relative prices 
of domestic and foreign goods, influencing net imports, and also the value of foreign currency 
denominated assets, with resulting balance sheet effects; and (iv) credit availability effects, 
which may include credit rationing if there are binding ceilings on interest rates . 
The predictability of the effects of monetary policy would therefore depend on the extent 
to which the macroeconomic incentives/distortions created by monetary policy pursuits affect 
individual country economic aggregates as well as the level of asymmetry it implies among 
intending members of the union.  Borrowing largely from the theoretical and analytical 
frameworks of Masson and Patillo (2004), Coleman (2001) and Duspaquier et. al (2005), the 
proposed model argues that monetary independence reflected in erstwhile trends of independent 
monetary aggregates, interest rates, pattern of banking systems’ credit to the economy and 
exchange rates adjustments have not been effective in stimulating growth and stemming inflation 
in these countries.  That being the case, one cannot but agree with Coleman (2001) that it would 
be better for these countries to consider alternatives to monetary independence.  Aside from 
monetary policy instruments, the extent to which fiscal policy distortions compromise monetary 
policy pursuits would be built into the model.  The objective would be to infer that countries 
whose monetary policies yield undesirable results, in addition to a compromising fiscal stance, 
would do well to surrender their control of such policies to a superior regional authority.   
The Implicit form of the Model 
 The implicit functions of these models can be rendered as follows: 
  ( ) )1(,,,,2 LLLLL∫= iiiiii EXRCGCPMRRMGDP   
 ( ) )2(,,,,2 LLLLL∫= iiiiii EXRCGCPMRRMCPI  
Whereby, the dependent variables GDPi and CPIi are defined as Real GDP and Consumer Price 
Index for country i.   The independent variables are M2i defined as Money Supply (M2); MRRi 
defined as the Minimum Rediscount Rate - a variable that is expected to capture or reflect the 
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direction of interest rate policy; CGi is defined as banking system credit to government; CPi is 
the banking system’s credit to the private sector; EXRi  is the exchange rate.     
 The M2 variable is included in the model to measure the likely impact of expansionary 
monetary policy on both real economic growth and inflation.  Economic theory suggests that 
unrestrained monetary expansion would have a negative effect on output while fuelling 
inflationary pressures.  The MRR can be interpreted to represent and reflect the general direction 
of interest rate policy being pursued from the perspective of the monetary authority (the national 
central banks).  The magnitude and signs of the parameter estimates for CG and CP is designed 
to measure credit availability effects especially the extent to which credit to government have 
tended to crowd out private sector activities (which has adverse implication for growth and 
inflation).   The evaluation criteria are two fold: (i) If the parameter estimates for the explanatory 
variables are not significant, we would admit that control over monetary policy may not matter 
to that country, as ex ante, it is of no effect (the country would be better off in terms of Pareto 
optimality criteria to surrender her control over it in favour of ex post benefits); (ii) If they are 
significant but with wrong signs from theoretical expectations, we would conclude that although 
it matters but with adverse implications, it would all the same, be most desirable for such country 
to surrender their sovereignty over monetary policy to a superior regional authority.    
Explicit Dynamic Model 
If we assume that the form of two models is unknown, but that it is most likely to be non-
linear, then they can be represented by the following non-linear equation specifications:  
  )3(5432120 LLLLLtuiiiiiii eEXRCGCPMRRMGDP αααααα=
  )4(5432120 LLLLLtuiiiiiii eEXRCGCPMRRMCPI ββββββ=
 Each of this specification is made up of a system of cross-section specific structural 
equations which can be rendered explicitly in their log linear form as: 
)5()log()log()log()log()2log()log( 543210 Liiiiiiiiiiii EXRCGCPMRRMGDP αααααα +++++=
)6()log()log()log()log()2log()log( 543210 Liiiiiiiiiiii EXRCGCPMRRMCPI ββββββ +++++=  
These two equations are static and may not be quite appropriate for the type of analysis that is 
envisaged by this study.    
However, since it is intended that the dynamics of the national monetary and exchange 
rate policies would be additionally investigated, the pooled equations models would be estimated 
using a combination of autoregressive and distributed lag models.  If we denote the dependent 
variables as Y and the independent variables as X, and leaving out the cross-sectional identifiers, 
the dynamic models to be estimated can be rendered as: 
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)7(2312122110 LLLLtttitttt uXXXYYY ++++++= −−−− αααββα  
Whereby: the $s represents the coefficients of the autoregressive components of the model, 
while the "s stands for the coefficient of the independent variables and their lags.  Given that the 
starting point of our models show that there are two dependent variables (GDP and CPI), 
equation 3.7 can thus be rendered in their structural forms as: 
 )8(2312122110 LLLLtttitttt uXXXGDPGDPGDP ++++++= −−−− αααββα  
 )9(2312122110 LLLLtttitttt uXXXCPICPICPI ++++++= −−−− αααββα  
A close look at both equations would indicate that aside from the autoregressive variables, the 
purely exogenous variables are the same.  Also there is ample evidence in the literature which 
suggests that GDP is an important explanatory variable in any dynamic model targeted at 
explaining the inflation phenomenon of any country.  What perhaps is disputable is the direction 
of causality between the two variables which it is hoped the granger causality tests would help to 
identify.  What is obvious is that there is strong evidence that estimating structural equations 
using single equation models would amount to a partial impact analysis.  A general equilibrium 
analysis approach rooted in simultaneous equation models is often adjudged to be more efficient 
in this wise.   
In order to incorporate this into the model, equations 8 and 9 are modified as follows:  
)10(23121241322110 LLtttitttttt uXXXCPICPIGDPGDPGDP ++++++++= −−−−−− αααββββα
)11(23121241322110 LLtttitttttt uXXXCPICPIGDPGDPCPI ++++++++= −−−−−− αααββββα  
Thus, a two period lag of the dependent variable is included to capture the autoregressive aspect 
of the model.  
Given the fact that the purely exogenous variables in the models are about five, equation 
10 and 11 can be rendered in more complete and general form as: 
)12(
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11
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hereby: the autoregressive variables are as defined earlier on, while the distributed lag 
components (Xk) can be defined as:  
• X1  = M2t; X2  = MRRt; X3 = CPt; X4 = CGt  and  X5 = EXRt  
• X6 = M2 (t-1); X7  = MRRt-1; X8 = CPt-1; X9 = CGt-1  and  X10 = EXRt-1 
• X11  = M2(t-2); X12  = MRRt-2; X13 = CPt-2; X14 = CGt-2  and  X15 = EXRt-2  
Thus, the pooled equations models of equations 12 and 13 would be estimated through vector 
autoregressive and distributed lag single equation regression estimation procedures.  However, 
since at the cross-sectional level, there is ample evidence to show that policy variables affect 
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simultaneously GDP and CPI variables, the two equations would also be estimated using 
simultaneous equation estimation procedures for each country.  The latter estimation procedure 
is often adjudged to yield better and more efficient estimates of the parameters and coefficients 
of the regression models. 
Data Issues 
 The major source of data for this analysis is IMF International Financial Statistics (2005).  
Following our specification, the measure of real GDP is the volume index based on 2000 = 100, 
and the consumer price indices for domestic prices.  Money supply is captured by M2 and 
adjusted appropriately.  The potential crowding out effect of domestic credit to the government is 
captured in the model, by the ratio of banking systems credit to government to that of its credit to 
the private sector.  The bias created by interest rate policy stance is captured by the trend in 
minimum rediscount rate of the central bank and/or the treasury bills rate (which the monetary 
authorities offer when they borrow from the public).  With regard to exchange rate variable, it is 
measured in terms of $ per national currency in equation (12), so as to reflect appropriately the 
direction of change which devaluations implies.  However, in equation (13), it is measured in 
terms of national currency per $1, as this would more appropriately reflect the increasing trend in 
domestic inflation which devaluations imply. 
4. Empirical Results 
 The intention of this section is to discuss these results with a view to providing logical 
answers to our earlier research question: “has an independent monetary and exchange rate policy 
of each intending member of the WAMZ been important in the determination of her 
macroeconomic outturns that could imply significant losses when they give up its control?”  
What are these equations telling us by way of answers to this question?  We shall discuss these 
results and draw inference under three sub headings: (i) Partial Effects of National Monetary and 
Exchange Rate Policy on Domestic Economic Growth; (ii) Partial Effects of National Monetary 
and Exchange Rate Policy on Domestic Inflation, and (iii) General Effects of National Monetary 
and Exchange Policy on WAMZ Regional Economic Performance.  
Partial Effects of National Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy on Domestic 
Economic Growth 
 The regression results of the estimates of the partial effects of national monetary and 
exchange rate policy on domestic economic growth of each of the participating country in 
WAMZ is presented in Table 1.  This was estimated using the GLS method with cross section 
weights.  It is estimated from a quarterly data sample spanning 1991:1 to 2004:4 which amounts 
to n = 56 observations.  The total number of the cross-sections, k is 5 which represent the five 
participating countries: Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.  The total balanced 
panel is n x k = 280.   In order to take account of short run transmission effects of monetary and 
exchange rate policy instruments, the model was estimated through a vector error correction 
model, which included the lagged values of the dependent variables in the pooled data.  The 
general pooled data for the entire panel included 2 dependent variables: GDP and CPI; and 5 
independent variables: money supply (MS2), Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR), banking 
system credit to private sector (CP), banking system credit to central Government (CG)  and 
exchange rate of the national currency to the US dollar (EXR).  The estimation procedures used a 
one-step weighting matrix with white heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance.  For analytical convenience, the regression results is summarized into Table 1. 
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.  V a ria b le s C o e ff ic ie n t t-S ta tis t ic
G D P (-1 ) 1 .7 7 2 0 2 4 .8
G D P (-2 ) -0 .7 7 1 7 -1 0 .4
L O G (C P I(-1 )) -0 .2 1 4 3 -1 .3
L O G (C P I(-2 )) 0 .1 8 2 4 1 .1
M S 2 (-2 ) -0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 5 -4 .2
M R R (-1 ) 0 .0 0 0 3 7 0 0 0 .2
C P (-1 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 9 4 .0
C G -0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 3 -2 .8
C G (-2 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 .6
L O G (E X R (-2 )) 0 .0 9 3 2 3 9 2 .3
F ixe d  E ffe c ts
_ G A M --C 0 .1 8 1 8
_ G H A --C -0 .3 2 8 3
_ G U I--C -0 .2 0 6 5
_ N IG --C -0 .1 4 4 6
_ S L N --C -0 .6 9 6 8
W e ig h te d  S ta tis tic s
R -s q u a re d 0 .9 9 9 9 8
A d ju s te d  R -s q u a re d 0 .9 9 9 9 7 9
S .E . o f re g re s s io n 0 .9 8 4 5 6 5
L o g  lik e lih o o d -1 6 7 .4
D u rb in -W a ts o n  s ta t 1 .9 8
    M e a n  d e p e n d e n t va r 3 1 9 .4
    S .D . d e p e n d e n t va r 2 1 3 .3
    S u m  s q u a re d  re s id 2 4 7 .2
    F -s ta tis t ic 9 0 1 4 6 4 .8
    P ro b (F -s ta tis t ic ) 0 .0
U n w e ig h te d  S ta tis t ic s
R -s q u a re d 0 .9 9 7 9 5 5
A d ju s te d  R -s q u a re d 0 .9 9 7 8 4 3
S .E . o f re g re s s io n 1 .1 2 5 4 3 9
D u rb in -W a ts o n  s ta t 1 .8 3
    M e a n  d e p e n d e n t va r 1 1 8 .6
    S .D . d e p e n d e n t va r 2 4 .2
    S u m  s q u a re d  re s id 3 2 3 .0
W A M Z
G D P
a b le  1 : S in g le  E q u a tio n  R e s u lts  fo r  E q . 1 2
 An evaluation of this results show that except for MRR and the Lagged values of CPI, all 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 
especially the lagged values are statistically 
significant.  The adjusted R2 value is very high, 
suggesting that the included explained significantly 
the changes in the dependent variable.  However, 
except for the lagged value of GDP(-1), these 
coefficients suggest that the responsiveness of the 
GDP to changes in the explanatory variables is 
inelastic.  Contrary to expectation, majority of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are wrongly 
signed.  Indeed, the coefficients of the lagged GDP(-
2), Log(CPI(-1), MS(-2) and CG are negatively 
signed suggesting that these policy variables really 
stagnate growth in these countries.  Interestingly, the 
Durbin Watson (DW) value is 1.98 (approximately 
2.0) which suggests the absence of autocorrelation in 
the data.  This may be suggestive of the fact that this 
model does not suffer from specification errors which 
would have been the inference had the DW being low.  The chances of misspecification appears 
to be minimized with the adoption of a fixed effects pooled regression methods which estimates 
differential constants for each of the cross-section of the panel.    
D
In d e p
T
e p . V a ria b le
 The inference from this pooled regression result is that, on the aggregate, erstwhile 
domestic monetary policy, as captured by MS(-2) and CG hurt real domestic output of these 
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Dep. V ariab le
Indep. V ariab les Coeffic ient t-S ta tis tic
G DP (-1) -0 .0003 -0 .2
G DP (-2) 0 .0002 0.2
LO G (CP I(-1)) 1 .1473 6.4
LO G (CP I(-2)) -0 .2071 -1 .2
M S 2 0.0000001 2.9
M S 2(-1) -0 .0000001 -2 .9
M RR 0.0024 3.0
M RR (-1) -0 .0015 -2 .1
CP (-1) 0 .0219 4.5
CG (-1) 0 .0000001 4.6
E XR 0.000031 3.8
E XR(-1) -0 .000026 -3 .3
F ixed E ffects
G A M --C 0.1398
G HA --C 0.0854
_G UI--C 0 .0694
_N IG --C 0.0006
_S LN--C -0 .0032
W eighted S tatis tics
R-squared 0.99996
A djusted R -squared 0.99995
S .E . o f regress ion 0.04568
Log like lihood 563.4
Durbin-W atson s ta t 2 .04
    M ean dependent var 8 .819
    S .D . dependent var 6 .577
    S um  squared res id 0.517
    F -s tatis tic 342103.5
    P rob(F -statis tic ) 0 .0
Unweighted S tatis tics
R-squared 0 .9964
A djusted R -squared 0 .9961
S .E . o f regress ion 0 .0528
Durbin-W atson s ta t 2 .54
    M ean dependent var 4 .523
    S .D . dependent var 0 .849
    S um  squared res id 0.690
LO G (C P I)
W A M Z
T able 2: S ing le Equation R esults  fo r Eq. 13
countries.  Indeed, rather than promote growth, it was a source of stagnation.  It also confirms 
that there appear to be a two quarters lag in monetary policy transmission effect with regard to 
real sector output.  This is most worrisome when we realize that the coefficient estimate of the 
CG  variable (at level) affects instantaneously real output negatively, a situation that is only 
moderated with a two-period lag (CG(-2)).  The net effect sufficiently dampens the positive 
effects of CP(-1) variable, confirming the theoretical expectation of the crowding out effect of 
credit to government in these countries.  Interestingly on the aggregate, the Log(EXR(-2) of the 
pooled regression model has a positive sign, suggesting that a two period lag positive 
transmission effect of exchange rate policy on real domestic output.  As can be seen from Table 
1, this outcome must have been induced by developments in Guinea (on current basis) and Sierra 
Leone (a two period lag log linear) cross-sectional data for the group, that show very strong 
positive relationship between exchange rates and real output, which sufficiently reversed the 
negative trends for all the other countries in the 
model.   
Partial Effects of National Monetary and 
Exchange Rate Policy on Domestic 
Consumer Prices 
 Table 2 presents the pooled regression 
results of national CPI (dependent variable) on 
selected domestic monetary and exchange rate 
policy instruments.   An evaluation of this 
results show that all the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables are statistically 
significant, except the lagged values of the GDP 
dependent variable and that of a one period lag 
of the LOG(CPI).  The inclusion of the CPI 
variable in its log linear form in the model was 
due to the poor fit of the linear variable in the 
pre-trial runs.  In order to ensure consistency in 
methodological approach, you would recall that 
this was the same form the variable took in the 
regression results presented earlier on in Table 
1. The non-significance of the lagged values of 
the GDP variable suggest that perhaps CPI does 
not granger cause GDP, while that of CPI (two 
_
_
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period lag) a co-integration of the first order.  The adjusted R2 value is very high, suggesting that 
the included explanatory variables explain significantly the changes in the dependent variable.  
However, except for the lagged value of CPI(-1), these coefficients suggest that the 
responsiveness of the CPI to changes in the explanatory variables is inelastic.  In accordance 
with theoretical expectations, the coefficient of a period lag value of the GDP(-1) independent 
variable is negative for all the equations, confirming the inverse relationship between output and 
inflation.  In other words, expansion in domestic output dampened aggregate consumer prices 
(inflation).  However, this was not adequate enough to dampen the fuelling effects of past 
inflation (especially a one period lag, which is significant and elastic), moderated only by the 
coefficient of the two period lag to a near unity.  Interestingly, the Durbin Watson (DW) value 
for the pooled equation is, suggesting the absence of autocorrelation in the model.   
 The net effect of money supply variable (MS2) is that it fuels inflation (on current basis), 
a situation that was moderated by the same magnitude of a period lag parameter estimate.  
Although these estimates were individually significant and inelastic, they amounted collectively 
to a negligible impact in quantum for the two periods.  The inference from is that at the regional 
level, the erstwhile use of money supply (control of money, especially through quantitative 
restrictions and reserve operating procedures), which were important features of WAMZ 
individual monetary policy pursuits, did very little to moderate rising domestic prices.   
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Simultaneous Effects of National Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies on 
Domestic Economic Growth and Inflation 
 The single equations regression results presented the partial impact of the same set of 
policy variables regressed on GDP and in turn on CPI.   As can be seen from the results, the 
estimated single equation models for each of the country data contained lagged dependent 
variables as part of the auto regressions.  However, the two equations estimated for each country 
can conveniently be considered to be interdependent, as the lagged value of one of the dependent 
variable featured prominently on the second equation.   This suggest that the examination of the 
subject of the impact of monetary and exchange rate policy on GDP and CPI can best be 
represented by a series of (two) simultaneous equations in line with our specified models.  Such 
a model would also give us a handle on the trade off implicit on the concurrent use of monetary 
versus exchange rate policies on the one hand, and between pursuit of inflation targeting vis-à-
vis stimulation of economic growth on the other hand.   A convenient way to present this 
analysis would be from the perspective of each country’s monetary and exchange rate policy 
pursuits and national macroeconomic performance.      
The Gambia 
 Table 3 below show the extracts of the simultaneous equation regression result for The 
Gambia.  A cursory look at the table reveals that with simultaneous equation estimation methods, 
monetary policy instruments reflected mainly in the money supply (a period lag of MS2), interest 
rate (current MRR) and credit to private sector (CP) had its impact solely on GDP, while the 
primary impact of exchange rate policy manifested mainly in domestic CPI.   This result is very 
interesting as it contradicts the single equation analysis (the b section of Table 3) show that both 
monetary and exchange rate policies influence GDP and CPI concurrently.  It is also interesting 
to note that while the simultaneous equation model results corroborates the  single equation 
model results of GDP dependent variable  that there exist a negative relationship between MRR 
and GDP in the Gambia,    it however contradicts with regard to credit to the private sector.  
Indeed, the simultaneous equation model suggests that credit to private sector have significant 
Endog. Variable Dep. Variable
Exogen. Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Indep. Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
C 13.7 4.35 6.75 3.59 C 3.8435 0.6717
GDP(-1) 1.561 17.9 GDP(-1) 1.634912 29 0.002 1.2
GDP(-2) -0.692 -8.4 GDP(-2) -0.72257 -15.1 -0.001 -0.6
CPI(-1) 0.874 29.4 CPI(-1)
LOG(CPI(-1)) LOG(CPI(-1)) -1.44987 -0.6 0.796 11.7
LOG(CPI(-2)) LOG(CPI(-2)) 2.703072 1.2 0.034 0.5
MS2 MS2 0.001221 3.9 -0.00002 -2.9
MS2(-1) 0.002 4.2 MS2(-1) 0.002082 4.9
MS2(-2) MS2(-2) -0.00106 -2.5
MRR -0.183 -4.1 MRR 0.002 2.0
MRR(-1) MRR(-1) -0.08885 -3 -0.002 -2.1
CP 0.001 2.9 CP 
CP(-1) CP(-1) -0.00065 -2 0.000027 4
CG(-1) CG(-1) 0.000026 3.3
CG(-2) CG(-2) -0.00056 -2.7
EXR 0.513 6.2 EXR
EXR(-1) EXR(-1) -0.09327 -2.1 0.005 3.4
R-squared 0.9994 0.9946 R-squared 0.99932 0.9936
Adjusted R-square 0.9993 0.9944 Adjusted R-squared 0.99928 0.9933
S.E. of regression 0.478 1.545 S.E. of regression 0.49237 0.0152
Log likelihood Log likelihood -183.6 755.4
Durbin-Watson sta 1.98 1.97 Durbin-Watson stat 2.24 1.95
    Mean dependent var 115.5 100.1     Mean dependent var 115.5 4.594
    S.D. dependent var 18.4 20.7     S.D. dependent var 18.3 0.185
    Sum squared resid 10.9 124.1     Sum squared resid 61.6 0.059
    F-statistic     F-statistic 24737.6 2843.4
    Prob(F-statistic)     Prob(F-statistic) 0 0
Table 3: Simultaneous and Single Equation Regression Results for Gambia
b.  Single Equation Model Results
GAMBIA GAMBIA
a. Simultaneous Equation Model Results
GDP CPI LOG(CPI)GDP
and positive effects on GDP which is consistent with theoretical expectations.  In terms of 
magnitude however, it does appear that lagged values (past trends) of GDP explains more the 
changes in current values than the monetary policy variables with the coefficient of the 
parameter estimates quite low.    
 With regard to the simultaneous equation result for the CPI dependent variable, it further 
confirms that exchange rate devaluations manifest mainly in domestic prices.  It also show that 
domestic inflation in the Gambia is best explained by mainly past inflation and exchange rate 
devaluation.   This inference is interesting, as it confirms our earlier hypothesis that devaluations 
helps to fuel domestic inflation, while at the same time hurting domestic economic activities 
because of its import dependence.  It thus helps to compound domestic inflation through 
imported inflation.  This is to be expected, since the Gambia is a small country in 
macroeconomic sense, of a price taker in world trade with non-traded currency.  Exchange rate 
devaluation would therefore produce more of domestic impact reflected in nominal increases in 
prices as she cannot take advantage of expenditure switching effects to stimulate her exports 
implicit there from. It is evident therefore that erstwhile monetary and exchange rates policy 
have not yielded the desired results in the Gambia during the period examined.   The inference to 
be drawn from this analysis is that monetary and exchange rate policies which minimize 
inflation, especially through exchange rates stability would augur well for the country rather than 
one that allows for periodic devaluations.   
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Ghana 
 Table 4 presents side by side, the simultaneous and single equations regression results for 
Ghana.  An evaluation of the simultaneous equation regression results show that the primary 
impact of interest rates policy as captured in the model by MRR variable (a period lag) is on 
GDP, while the money supply variable have significant simultaneous effects on both GDP and 
CPI confirming the a priori expectation that expansionary monetary policy could stimulate 
growth but at the expense of higher prices.  This is a trade-off that the monetary policy 
Dep. Variable Dep. Variable
Indep. Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Indep. Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
C 0.57 2.78 -42.11 -4.11 C 1.4116 -0.5820
GDP(-1) 1.329 12.6 GDP(-1) 1.1257170 19.2 -0.029 -1.7
GDP(-2) -0.331 -3.1 0.474 3.9 GDP(-2) -0.14138 -2.5 0.041 2.5
CPI(-1) 0.603 8.8 CPI(-1)
LOG(CPI(-1)) LOG(CPI(-1)) -0.42422 -2.4 1.166 19.0
LOG(CPI(-2)) LOG(CPI(-2)) 0.6052200 4.7 -0.344 -6.0
MS2 MS2 -0.00006 -8.5
MS2(-1) 0.00005 5.4 0.002 4.4 MS2(-1) 0.00006 8.0 0.000005 2.9
MRR MRR 0.0028 5.3
MRR(-1) 0.00708 3.4 0.156 2.6 MRR(-1) 0.01077 5.6
CP CP -0.00004 -7.7
CP(-1) CP(-1) 0.00022 7.7
CG(-1) CG(-1) 0.00006 5.9 0.00001 3.5
CG(-2) CG(-2) -0.00004 -4.3 -0.00001 -3.8
EXR EXR 0.00001 3.7
EXR(-1) 0.003 5.8 EXR(-1) -0.00007 -5.4
R-squared 0.9983 0.9983 R-squared 1.00000 0.9990
Adjusted R-squared 0.9981 0.9981 Adjusted R-squared 0.99998 0.9989
S.E. of regression 2.87 2.87 S.E. of regression 0.08759 0.0304
Log likelihood Log likelihood 282.6 567.9
Durbin-Watson stat 1.333 1.333 Durbin-Watson stat 1.88 1.74
    Mean dependent var 112.6 85     Mean dependent var 112.6 4.071
    S.D. dependent var 18.6 66.3     S.D. dependent var 18.5 0.932
    Sum squared resid 0.6 395.4     Sum squared resid 1.9 0.235
    F-statistic     F-statistic 798819.6 18062.6
    Prob(F-statistic)     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0 0.0
a. Simultaneous Equation Model Results b.  Single Equation Model Results
Table 4: Simultaneous and Single Equation Regression Results for Ghana
LOG(CPI)
GHANA
GDP CPI
GHANA
GDP
authorities have often argued that the economy would have to contend with.  The signs of all the 
parameter estimates of the CPI endogenous variable segment (a) of the simultaneous equation 
model) are positive but inelastic unlike the magnitude of the coefficients of the one-period lag of 
the GDP and CPI pre-determined variables (auto-regressions). 
  A critical review of the results would show that expansionary monetary policy 
contributed more to fuelling prices than it did to growth.  It also shows that interest rates policy 
had adverse effects on both GDP and CPI, since the parameter estimate is positive as against the 
theoretical expectation of an inverse relationship (i.e. lowering of interest rates should stimulate 
growth or vice versa).  This outcome is to be expected as the monetary authorities in Ghana 
combined the pursuit of expansionary monetary policy with rapid devaluations during the period 
under review.  Unfortunately, it had to complement these policy actions by keeping interest rate 
high principally as a short term tool to keep monetary expansion under control.   It can be 
inferred therefore that expansionary money supply and interest rates policy in Ghana was 
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counter-productive as they were also major source of rise in domestic consumer prices.  The 
significance on the exchange rate variable on solely the CPI segment of the simultaneous 
equation model also confirms that currency devaluations exercise in Ghana during the period 
under review is perhaps the main driving force behind domestic inflation.  Under this scenario, it 
can be inferred that Ghana can also benefit from exploring policy options that could foster 
exchange rate stability as a means of fostering stable domestic prices.   
Guinea 
 The simultaneous equation models result for Guinea is as shown in Table 5.  The 
econometric properties of the regression are very good.  As it seems, the monetary policy 
instruments reflected mainly in the credit to private sector (a period lag of CP) and interest rate 
Dep. Variable Dep. Variable
Indep. Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Indep. Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
C 8.03 3.41 38.07 4.48 C -15.5305 0.5131
GDP(-1) 1.63 18.1 -0.15 -1.8 GDP(-1) 1.6339210 21.1 0.0002 0.4
GDP(-2) -0.68 -7.9 GDP(-2) -0.67188 -9.4 0.0001 0.3
CPI(-1) 0.94 18.7 CPI(-1)
LOG(CPI(-1)) LOG(CPI(-1)) -7.228714 -1.4 1.3092 14.9
LOG(CPI(-2)) LOG(CPI(-2)) 11.94806 2.5 -0.4056 -5.5
MS2 MS2 0.000006 3.8 0.0000000805 4.1
MS2(-1) 0.000045 4.7 MS2(-1) -0.00002 -5.7 -0.00000006 -3.0
MRR(-1) -0.18 -2.7 -0.51 -2.3 MRR(-1) -0.161137 -3.6 -0.001456 -4.5
CP CP 0.00000005 2.8
CP(-1) 0.000009 2.7 CP(-1) 0.000009 3.6
CG CG 0.000004 4.4
CG(-1) CG(-1) 0.000004 4.4 0.00000004 4.0
CG(-2) CG(-2) 0.00000003 4.0
EXR EXR 0.001548 3.4
EXR(-1) -0.01 -2.2 EXR(-1) -0.0012 -3.1 -0.000006 -2.5
EXR(-2) -0.01 -2.2 EXR(-2)
R-squared 0.9988 0.99871 R-squared 0.999163 0.9995
Adjusted R-squared 0.9987 0.99857 Adjusted R-sq 0.99911 0.9994
S.E. of regression 0.6519 2.57771 S.E. of regress 0.538128 0.0054
Log likelihood Log likelihood -207.0 1033.8
Durbin-Watson stat 2.06 1.34 Durbin-Watson 2.33 2.20
    Mean dependent var 141.7 279.2    Mean depen 141.7 5.605
    S.D. dependent var 18.2 68.2    S.D. depend 18.04104 0.229
    Sum squared resid 20.8 318.9    Sum square 73.3 0.007
    F-statistic     F-statistic 18880.79 31858.3
    Prob(F-statistic)    Prob(F-stati 0 0
b.  Single Equation Model Results
GUINEA
Table 5: Simultaneous and Single Equation Regression Results for Guinea
GUINEA
a. Simultaneous Equation Model Results
GDP CPI GDP LOG(CPI)
 
(a period lag of MRR) had its impact solely on GDP, while the primary impact of expansionary 
money supply and exchange rate policy manifested mainly in domestic CPI.   This result is very 
interesting as it tends to suggest that the Guinean monetary authority were able to strike the right 
balance in the use of money reserves and interest rates operating procedures on the one hand, and 
exchange rate policy on the other hand, both of which yielded the desired results.  It is also 
interesting to note that unlike the single equation model results which suggest that the effects of 
monetary and exchange rate policies manifested in output and prices, the simultaneous equation 
model results has helped us to narrow it down to the segment of its primary impact.   The sign 
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and parameter estimate of the interest rate variable (MRR) is negative, confirming the existence 
of inverse relationship between it and domestic output.  The magnitude of the interest rate 
variable also show that it significantly influence output much more than that of credit to the 
private sector variable.  The dampening effect of interest rate policy on domestic CPI of Guinea 
as evidenced from the significance and negative relationship of the parameter estimate in the 
simultaneous equation model results of CPI dependent variable segment is a good example of 
effective monetary policy pursuit.  This is further attested to by the parameter estimate of the one 
period lag predetermined GDP variable which is significant (at less than 10 per cent level) and 
exhibited the right negative sign, suggesting that Guinean prices reflect supply conditions.   
    With regard to the simultaneous equation result for the CPI dependent variable, the 
adverse effect of expansionary monetary policy on domestic prices was significantly moderated 
by the maintenance of relatively stable exchange rates.  It does appear that domestic prices in 
Guinea are very responsive to the exchange rate variable and its control can be a veritable 
instrument at the monetary authority’s disposal for targeting inflation. This is in conformity with 
the objectives of modern day central banking which increasingly resorts to monetary policy rules 
which tends to prefer inflation targeting to growth targeting, as a monetary policy objective.    
Perhaps this result is to be expected, as the Guinean monetary authority is known to have pegged 
their national currency to the French Franc during the period under review.  It can reasonably be 
argued that the salutary effects of exchange rates policies can be traced principally to this source.   
The inference to be drawn from this analysis is that monetary and exchange rate policies which 
minimize inflation, especially through exchange rates stability and which augured well for 
Guinea may hold the key to macroeconomic stability and convergence of the other WAMZ 
participating countries.  
Nigeria 
 The simultaneous regression result for Nigeria is presented in Table 6.  The result shows 
that the endogenous variables are simultaneously explained by their lagged values, money supply 
(one period lag) and credit to private sector (current value) variables.   However, the sign of the 
parameter estimates of the two variables differ in both equations.  Whereas the coefficient of the 
parameter estimates of the two explanatory variables exhibited negative sign in the GDP 
endogenous variable equation of the simultaneous model, it exhibited a positive sign in that of 
CPI endogenous equation.   This suggest that money supply and credit to private sector adversely 
affected output, contrary to the theoretical expectation that appropriate application of these 
policy instruments by the monetary authority is expected to have a positive effects.   It is also 
interesting to note that this result corroborates the single equation results that erstwhile 
Dep. Variable Dep. Variable
Indep. Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Indep. Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
C 3.33 3.40 3.02 3.2 C 5.1433 -0.8591
GDP(-1) 1.383 12.4 GDP(-1) 1.346537 13.3 -0.01381 -1.3
GDP(-2) -0.422 -4.0 GDP(-2) -0.407835 -4.4 0.01151 1.0
CPI(-1) 0.996 38.2 CPI(-1)
LOG(CPI(-1)) LOG(CPI(-1)) -0.479 -2.1 1.21262 26.4
LOG(CPI(-2)) LOG(CPI(-2)) 0.53 2.3 -0.39111 -9.4
MS2(-1) -0.422 -4.0 0.000018 3.1 MS2(-1) -0.0000006 -3.7 0.0000001 3.7
MS2(-2) MS2(-2) -0.0000001 -4.5
MRR(-1) MRR(-1) -0.010653 -3.4 -0.00367 -4.1
CP -0.000001 -2.3 -0.000021 -2.2 CP 
CP(-1) CP(-1) 0.0000028 6.0 0.15293 7.2
CG -0.000003 -1.0 CG
CG(-1) CG(-1) -0.0000004 -3.2
CG(-2) CG(-2) 0.00000008 3.8
EXR EXR 0.00036 3.0
EXR(-1) -0.041 -1.9 EXR(-1) 0.003616 5.5 -0.00045 -4.1
R-squared 0.99982 0.99691 R-squared 0.99985 0.99817
Adjusted R-squared 0.99981 0.99660 Adjusted R-squared 0.99984 0.99806
S.E. of regression 0.16670 2.93953 S.E. of regression 0.14886 0.03667
Log likelihood Log likelihood 138.9 517.7
Durbin-Watson stat 2.08 1.55 Durbin-Watson stat 2.01 2.00
    Mean dependent var 94.3 83.4    Mean dependent v 94.3 4.178
    S.D. dependent var 11.9 50.4    S.D. dependent va 11.8 0.833
    Sum squared resid 1.4 423.4    Sum squared resi 5.7 0.342
    F-statistic     F-statistic 121640.6 9237.4
    Prob(F-statistic)     Prob(F-statistic) 0 0.0
a. Simultaneous Equation Model Results b.  Single Equation Model Results
NIGERIA
Table 6: Simultaneous and Single Equation Regression Results for Nigeria
NIGERIA
GDP CPI GDP LOG(CPI)
expansionary monetary policy (reflected in MS2 variable) has significant positive relationship to 
domestic prices.  Indeed, this relationship overwhelms the moderating impact of the credit to the 
economy (reflected in both the credit to private sector and to government variables) and 
exchange rate variables which exhibited negative signs, suggesting the relative inadequacy of 
credit and exchange rate policy at contending with domestic inflation.    
The results of the simultaneous equation models also suggest that Nigeria’s monetary 
policy impacted negatively on domestic output while at the same time fuelling rapid increases in 
domestic prices.  This is to be expected as available data show that during the period under 
review the monetary authority’s actions resulted in rapid expansion in money supply and the 
maintenance of an interest rate structure that was negative in real terms.   The pattern of credit to 
the private sector was more worrisome, as its parameter estimate from the simultaneous 
equations models is negative, contrary to the single equations model estimation which earlier 
posted a significant one period lag.  One is inclined to agree more with the simultaneous 
equations estimates that erstwhile credit especially to the private sector was crowded out by 
unrestrained credit to government, which perhaps became manifest solely in the CPI equations of 
the models.   The CPI dependent equations show that the parameter estimate of the coefficient of 
a period lag of money supply (MS2) was significant and exhibited the right sign.  It can therefore 
be inferred that apart from its adverse effects on output, rapid monetary expansion have 
contributed in no small measure to inflationary pressure in Nigeria.    
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 It is also interesting to note that the coefficient of the exchange rate variable in both the 
simultaneous and single equations model for Nigeria were significant and exhibited the right 
signs.  It confirms our a priori expectation that exchange rate appreciation should help to 
moderate prices.  This is to be expected in the Nigerian situation since she depends to a large 
extent on imports for capital goods, raw materials and final consumer goods to augment her 
inadequate domestic output and supply.  Indeed, it is estimated that the forex content of domestic 
economic activity in Nigeria is very high, such that devaluations of exchange rates helps to 
compound the adverse effects of imported inflation within the economy.     
The inference that can be drawn from the analysis so far is that erstwhile domestic 
monetary policy has largely been unsuccessful in taming inflation, but not because of the 
apparent lack of control over excessive credit expansion especially to the government sector.   
As it seems, the Nigerian monetary authority was unable to strike an appropriate balance with 
the combination of the two policy instruments which effectively resulted in net adverse trade-
offs.  It became apparent that the relative success at stabilizing exchange rates was compromised 
by the excessive monetization of foreign exchange earnings during the period in support of fiscal 
spending.    
Incidentally, the primary source of monetary expansion could therefore be traced to the 
excessive monetization and/or draw-down on foreign exchange reserves, to the extent that 
monetary authority’s measures of restraints could not contend with.   Indeed, at a time, the 
monetary authorities had to introduce its own borrowing certificates to mop up excess liquidity 
arising from the excessive monetization of reserves, but have had to contend with servicing the 
debts arising there from through fiat money.  The big dilemma was that the central bank could 
not convince the fiscal authorities through moral suasion to spend prudently since they were not 
borrowing from her and the instruments for contending with the situation were simply 
inadequate.   Also, the monetary authority could not act rightly largely because she lacks the 
political autonomy and will to do so, as they were appointed by the government of the day.  It 
can therefore be concluded that if monetary and exchange rate policies are to be effective, an 
institutional framework which guarantees their autonomy from undue influence from national 
fiscal authorities is imperative.  This can only come to be, within the context of this analysis, by 
surrendering monetary and exchange rate policies to a supra national body in the form of a 
monetary union.  However, this line of action is itself a political one that would require the active 
endorsement of the political authority. 
Sierra Leone 
 The simultaneous equation result for Sierra Leone is as shown in Table 7.  While the 
GDP dependent variable was determined solely by money supply, interest rate (MRR) and credit 
Dep. Variable Dep. Variable
Indep. Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Indep. Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
C 1.29 0.69 3.14 1.57 C 18.1406 1.6513
GDP(-1) 1.55 15.39 GDP(-1) 1.478 23.3 1.000 -4.1
GDP(-2) -0.56 -5.33 GDP(-2) -0.591 -11.0 0.004 1.9
CPI(-1) 0.40 3.35 CPI(-1)
LOG(CPI(-1)) LOG(CPI(-1)) -3.892 -3.7 0.437 6.9
LOG(CPI(-2)) LOG(CPI(-2)) -6.159 -4.9 0.183 3.4
MS2 MS2 0.000003 3.5
MS2(-1) 0.00002 2.53 MS2(-1) -0.000003 -3.0
MS2(-2) MS2(-2) 0.00004 5.2
MRR -0.04 -2.04 MRR -0.06223 -5.7 0.002 4.4
MRR(-1) MRR(-1) -0.002 -4.7
CP CP 0.000002 2.4
CP(-1) CP(-1) -0.00005 -3.5
CP(-2) -0.000078 -1.83 CP(-2)
CG CG -0.000002 -2.3
CG(-1) CG(-1) 0.00000019 6.0
CG(-2) 0.000014 1.62 CG(-2) 0.000003 3.4
EXR 0.023 4.45 EXR 0.00015 6.0
LOG(EXR(-2)) LOG(EXR(-2)) 4.713 3.1
R-squared 0.9921 0.9629 R-squared 0.99356 1.0000
Adjusted R-squared 0.9913 0.9607 Adjusted R-square 0.99321 0.9854
S.E. of regression 2.1271 7.1210 S.E. of regression 1.86478 0.0778
Log likelihood Log likelihood -543.6 314.7
Durbin-Watson stat 1.75 2.17 Durbin-Watson sta 1.95 2.22
    Mean dependent var 128.9 69.0    Mean dependen 128.9 4.057
    S.D. dependent var 22.8 35.9    S.D. dependent 22.6 0.643
    Sum squared resid 217.2 2535.5    Sum squared re 886.7 1.537
    F-statistic     F-statistic 2811.6 1209.4
    Prob(F-statistic)     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0 0
GDP CPI GDP LOG(CPI)
Table 7: Simultaneous and Single Regression Results for Sierra Leone
SIERRA LEONE SIERRA LEONE
b.  Single Equation Model Resultsa. Simultaneous Equation Model Results
to private sector (a two-period lag) variables, that of CPI was determined entirely by credit to 
government (a two-period lag) and current values of exchange rate variables.  The coefficients of 
the parameter estimates of money supply was significant and positive, confirming that 
expansionary monetary policy could be instrumental to growth within the period under review.  
The sign of the interest rate variable is negative in line with a priori expectation that low interest 
rates should stimulate output.  However, the sign of the credit to private sector variable (two 
period lag) is negative, indicating an inverse relationship contrary to theoretical expectations.   
Perhaps this could be explained by the fact that for a significant period under review, Sierra 
Leone economy was under stress as a result of civil war and internecine crisis.  Under such 
enabling environment, macroeconomic pursuits and policies could have suffered distortions and 
severe shocks, may not have reflected a normal situations.   It is therefore not surprising 
therefore that the effects of credit to government and exchange rate policies manifested solely in 
the CPI endogenous variable of the simultaneous equation model.  With economic activities 
disrupted by war, fiscal borrowing could have been devoted more to disaster management, and in 
post-war period, to reconstruction and rehabilitation of social infrastructure which could be 
inflationary in the short run.   
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5. Concluding Remark 
 This study confirmed that in recent time, especially post-SAP era, both monetary and 
exchange rate policies have had adverse effects on economic growth and inflation in Nigeria.  
The relative ineffectiveness stemmed in part from the lack of political autonomy (which often 
led to a compromising stance with respect to its choice of instruments for monetary controls) and 
partly to inappropriate choice of instruments, with inherent bias against growth, but laying very 
strong foundation for inflationary spiral.  It does appear that under this macroeconomic 
environment, there is little prospect for improvement except some alternative actions are taken to 
overcome the overbearing political influence.  This can be found in entering into a currency 
union, with the surrender of monetary and exchange rate policy to a superior body.  
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